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1. Introduction
One often hears the term ‘Europe’ being used interchangeably with ‘European Union’, giving
the impression that those countries that are not destined to become members of the EU in the
near future are not part of the same continent. Even after the forthcoming accession by 13 new
countries, a significant part of Europe will remain outside the ‘EU club’.
Enlargement of the European Union will create a new external EU border in the eastern part
of the continent. This new border will stretch from the north beginning with the twin town of
Narva-Ivangorod on the Estonian-Russian border, through areas of Western Belarus bordering
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, to the Ukrainian borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and
all the way south along the Romanian border with Moldova and Ukraine. There will also be
the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, surrounded by the EU countries of Poland and Lithuania.
Other new external EU borders will be drawn between Hungary and Slovenia on the one hand
and Yugoslavia and Croatia on the other.
For both practical and symbolic reasons, the management of this future border will have a
profound impact on relations between the EU and the non-EU parts of Europe. It is very
important for the EU to take all possible measures to facilitate the crossing of its borders by
the citizens of states neighbouring the EU. The construction of a new wall at the eastern-most
extremes of the EU is an anachronism in post-cold war era. The stability of the countries of
Eastern and  South-Eastern Europe that are outside the EU will be one of the crucial
challenges for the enlarged European Union as a whole.
EU policies, whether explicitly targeted at non-candidate countries or only affecting them
indirectly, should be fundamentally consistent to produce the desired result. Such consistency
would not only encourage the governments of that region to implement the institutional and
economic reforms that would put the countries on a European track, but would also appeal to
and reinforce the pro-European aspirations of ordinary citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia
and Moldova and the countries of former Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately, however, such consistency appears to be lacking. In fact, one can observe a
distinct lack of coherence and coordination among three principal areas of EU policy, namely
external relations, enlargement and justice and home affairs.
First, looking at EU foreign policies (CFSP) manifested both in high-level declarations by top
EU officials and some of the Foreign Ministers of member countries, one can see an attempt
to maintain a certain degree of openness towards the countries neighbouring with the enlarged
EU. The line here is that no new Berlin walls are to be erected and that the closest possible
partnerships are the ultimate goal.
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These declarations, however, are contradicted by the dynamics of the enlargement process,
where the strict application of the Schengen  acquis concerning border controls and visa
regimes is required from candidate countries. Their willingness to implement all restrictive
border provisions is considered as one of most important indicators of their preparedness for
membership. Furthermore, and in contrast to the stance taken vis-à-vis current EU member
states, this appears to be a non-negotiable issue.
The underlying reason for such EU positions lies in the domain of EU home affairs policy,
which is strongly influenced by widespread fear of uncontrolled immigration from beyond EU
territory, and criminal activity by foreigners within members state societies. Restrictive
immigration controls, manifested in particular in the form of visa regimes at external borders,
are seen as a necessary response to those fears and determine the nature of external borders.
This is the case, despite fact that visas are not necessarily very effective instruments in
curbing either criminal activity or illegal immigration.
These fears result in a paradox: new members are expected to introduce ‘hard’ Schengen
borders that could negatively affect these countries’ relations with non-EU neighbours, while
at the same time the expected advantage of lifting border controls between old and new
members, and the freedom of taking up employment, will be delayed for several years after
accession. This consequence will not only have a negative impact on future EU neighbouring
countries, but it will also produce feelings of second-class membership among new members.
The EU’s position is generated by a dual fear on the part of current members: fear of
immigration from non-candidate countries (the citizens of which are all subject to the visa
regime) but also the fear of immigration originating from candidate countries. That is why the
citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, which are already negotiating their accession, still have to
obtain visas to visit EU countries. (The requirement was only very recently lifted for
Bulgaria).
Candidate states are being asked to fully implement the Schengen acquis without sufficient
consideration being given to the maintenance of stable geo-political relations in the region.
In the 1990s, the walls that had divided Europe since the end of the Second World War ceased
to exist. One was the boundary between the bloc of socialist states and Western Europe. The
other, far less frequently mentioned, was the heavily guarded border between the USSR and
Moscow’s satellite countries.
As a result of the complex forces that brought down these walls, a unique area of liberalised
movement of persons emerged in Central Europe. The citizens of the states that became
candidates for membership of the EU (with the exception of Bulgarian and Romanian
citizens), were granted the possibility to travel to the EU without a visas. On the other hand,
inhabitants of countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus, have been able to travel to Central
and Eastern Europe without major difficulty. The open borders policy was a part of a wider
policy of maintaining good relationships with neighbouring countries pursued by the
governments of the Central European states. Such regional and bilateral cooperation has been
encouraged by the West since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is generally seen to have played
a significant role in preventing destabilisation in the region, as occurred following the First
World War in Central and Eastern Europe, and as happened in the Balkans in the 1990s. The
open-borders policy has affected thousands of ordinary citizens on both sides of the border,
and has significantly contributed to efforts to overcome the historical legacy of mutual
prejudice, stereotypes and resentment. Among the numerous examples one may single out the
difficult and blood-tainted relationships between Poland and Russia, between Poland and
Ukraine and between Hungary and Romania. Open borders have also fostered contacts ofFRIENDLY SCHENGEN BORDERLAND POLICY
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national minorities, such as the Belarussians in Poland or the Hungarians in Ukraine (Trans-
Carpatia), Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) and Romania, with their mother countries.
The EU accession of Central European states such as Poland, Hungary or Slovakia, may lead
to the disappearance of that specific  area of liberalised movement of persons. As EU
candidate countries adopt the Schengen acquis, they will have to impose visas on citizens of
neighbouring countries that are not in line for membership. The process of implementation of
the Schengen system has already begun. In February 2000, the Czech Republic announced
that it would introduce visa requirements for citizens of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
Slovakia followed suit the following month, while the Romanian government announced that
it would introduce visas for Moldovans. In September, Estonia introduced a full visa regime
for Russian citizens. This followed the termination in March of the Estonian-Russian
agreement on simplified border crossings. In December 2000, Bulgaria announced that it was
withdrawing from its bilateral agreement on visa-free travel with Russia. Poland intends to
introduce visas for Belarussians and Russians probably this year, and on the date of its
accession to the EU, for Ukrainians. Lithuania has warned that it may have to terminate the
agreement allowing visa-free travel for residents of Kaliningrad by 2003. Thus, one of the
unquestionable achievements of the 1990s, which consisted of the freedom of travel between
Eastern Europe and Central Europe, is seriously endangered.
The strict application of the Schengen border regime in general, and visa policy in particular,
will directly affect and reinforce the growing socio-economic and psychological gap between
the two parts of Europe. It will also adversely affect national minorities for example,
Hungarian minorities living in the states neighbouring Hungary (Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine
and Serbia). It is likely that Romania (at least for the time being
1), Ukraine and Serbia (with
the exception of Slovakia) will be subject to the Schengen visa regime.
In fact, Hungary’s adoption of the Schengen acquis without modification could constitute a
breach of its treaty commitment with Romania to maintain free cross-border contacts across
frontiers for minorities. Moreover, this treaty was concluded only in 1996 with strong
pressure from the EU.
For the first time since the end of the cold war, the EU will border an area that has essentially
different political, economic and social systems. The imposition of restrictive principles for
crossing the borders will contribute to the widening of these gaps, which will be detrimental
to the European Union as a whole.
Paradoxically the end of the cold war adversely affected former Yugoslavia. One of the
distinctive features of Yugoslav communism as opposed to the Soviet-style regime, was a
general freedom of travel granted its citizens. With the advent of war in Bosnia, European
countries started to impose visa regimes in an effort to limit the number of refugees seeking
safety in Western Europe. By the end of the 1990s, the situation was extremely confused, with
citizens of Croatia enjoying visa-free access to the EU, while citizens of Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and rump Yugoslavia were obliged to obtain visas; not to mention the thousands
who left bereft of any citizenship documentation whatsoever by the conflicts.
2. The Schengen acquis today
The EU has imposed a fixed set of rules on new members, laid out in some 3,000 pages of the
Schengen acquis. While this will bring undisputed advantages in some areas, it has not
produced the intended result in others. Furthermore, there is an element of a double standard
being introduced here in EU policy, since some current EU countries are allowed to ‘opt-out’
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of the Schengen agreement and others that have signed up to the agreement are in reality
implementing the Schengen rules selectively according to national preferences.
Freedom of movement – one of fundamental rights of EU citizens ￿ is suffering various
obstructions. Sixteen years since the signing of the Schengen Agreements in 1985, there are
still visible and hidden barriers to the free movement of persons.
Schengen was expected to facilitate the free movement of persons in the Schengen zone.
Before one can gain access to the Schengen area, however, various conditions need to be
fulfilled by the nationals of countries that are subject to the visa regime.
A lack of transparency and barriers to access to information persist in the granting of
Schengen visas. From evidence received, it seems to be that there are unofficial quotas
established by some of the Schengen countries which have the effect of limiting the number
of visas issued, particularly for certain countries of origin. The justification for not granting
the visa is not necessarily ‘a threat to public order’, but also that a certain number of visas
have already been granted to nationals of that state during that same year.
The continued existence of national immigration policies means that third-country nationals
may be lawfully resident in one member state but an illegal alien in another. Even if s/he can
argue that s/he cannot be subject to control at the internal frontiers of the Schengen zone, s/he
may be confronted by continuing national restrictions on immigration, enforced by rigorous
methods of internal controls.
SIS II will not be completely set up till 2004. Candidate countries are preparing themselves so
that they can be in full conformity with a system that has not yet been sufficiently explained
to them.
Approximation of laws and harmonisation of legal and administrative provisions have
undisputedly been the leading technical instrument of European integration, laying the
foundation for the basic freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and people) that
define the content of united Europe. Exceptions or deviations from a general model
maintained by some members states have been regarded as distortions and negative factors
from an integrationist perspective.
In view of the circumstances outlined above, the enlarged EU faces a serious dilemma. Is a
uniform approach the best way to ensure a stable, prosperous Union? Does the orthodox,
inflexible approach of imposing a pre-defined set of Schengen rules on new members really
best serve its purpose? These questions are especially valid in light of the fact that one of the
major underlying concepts behind the EU’s external border is deeply embedded in a European
immigration policy that requires major rethinking.
3. Recommendations
The specific recommendations contained in this paper focus on the visa policy of the enlarged
EU. Visas are still seen as one of the main instruments for controlling external EU borders. As
noted above, the criterion for not granting a visa is not necessarily that the individual presents
‘a threat to public order’ or poses a high risk of immigration or illegal employment. There
seems to be an unofficial quota system established by some of the Schengen countries under
which only a limited number of visas are approved, particularly for applicants of certain
countries, in any one year. Other ‘unofficial’ elements of the current EU visa policy include
long waiting periods and bothersome procedures. Visa applicants may be obliged to wait for
up to three weeks and in some cases, the visa has been refused for reasons that are not
communicated to the applicant. Applicants often have to go through in-depth interviews thatFRIENDLY SCHENGEN BORDERLAND POLICY
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intrude on their privacy. Moreover, due to a lack of transparency in the administration of
Schengen visas, it is not clear to whom applicants can submit an appeal if their application is
denied.
Another important aspect is the Schengen Information System (SIS). The implication of
having one's name on the SIS list could range from simply having one's documents
scrutinised every time one enters the Schengen zone, to a blank refusal of a visa. Not all
Schengen countries feel obliged to offer an explanation for refusing to issue a visa and this is
a policy area that is still governed by the principle of sovereignty of each Schengen state. The
persons usually included in the SIS database are those who either have a criminal record (even
simply defined as a threat to public order) or have possibly been subject to a criminal act. In
the latter case, persons whose documents were stolen while visiting or residing in a Schengen
country, and whose documents were later replaced, but had filed a report with the police of
that country, would also be listed in the SIS to prevent the fraudulent use of the stolen
documents by another person. In such cases, the ‘victim of the theft’ may also be asked
intrusive questions by the immigration officer to verify his/her identity.
The recommendations proposed below can be divided into two basic groups:
The first group includes recommendations for the near future. The assumption here is that due
to the political climate in the member states, neither a major amendment of the Schengen
acquis nor an approach of partial or selective implementation of the acquis by accession
countries is possible at present. We put forward specific options that can be undertaken by the
candidate states and the European Union in order to minimise the potentially negative effects
on the movement of persons between non-candidate countries and prospective members.
These options are based on the premise that the Schengen acquis leaves a certain margin of
flexibility and adjustment to meet the particular needs at hand.
The second group includes far-reaching recommendations, based on the belief that the
Schengen provisions should be modified to better serve the fundamental aim of a open, free
and undivided Europe proclaimed by the European Union.
3.1 Solutions within the Schengen acquis framework
The recommendations presented below take into account the assumption that the candidate
countries will introduce visa requirements on the traffic of persons from the blacklisted states
no later than their date of accession to EU membership. Their principal aim is to alleviate the
undesirable results of the introduction of the visa regime and enable easier access to visas, so
as to remove the major impediments preventing the citizens of Eastern Europe from travelling
to Central European countries. The achievement of this goal requires a range of activities and
the fulfilment of numerous conditions, as presented below.
a) Upgrading and reinforcement of consular services
•  More consular staff
In order to process a similar magnitude of persons crossing these border today, the majority of
whom possess single-entry visas, more consular staff will be required in order to provide for
smooth cross-border traffic. For example, the Polish consular services stationed in the
countries of Eastern Europe would need to issue ca. 5,000 visas per day.
This translates into the necessity to employ some 250–300 consular officers and to provide
the consulate outposts with adequate premises. This calls for the coordination of efforts
between the consulates of member states of the enlarged EU. The network of consulates
should be developed as appropriate along the future eastern border of the EU.APAP, B ORATYNSKI, EMERSON , GROMADZKI, VAHL & WHYTE
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•  Visa: a right, not a privilege?
A visa must not be deemed a privilege. The policy concerning visas should not consist of
coercing the applicant to prove his or her innocence, but just the routine granting of a visa,
unless there is evidence suggesting a prior illegal stay of a given citizen in the country issuing
the visa, or criminal activities on record. It is very important that the manner in which visas
are granted should not give rise to a sense, among the citizens of non-EU countries, of being
marginalised or of being second-class Europeans. The manner in which visa applicants are
handled should be an expression of impartial professionalism on the part of the civil servant
and customer-oriented service.
The organisation of consular work should eliminate queues to the extent possible. If long
waiting times cannot be prevented, a numbered queue system or appointments at a specific
time should be arranged as standard practice.
An extremely important measure facilitating the visa application procedure consists of the
option to submit an application by mail (the application forms could be also made available
from the consulates’ websites), whereby only a single visit to the consulate would suffice to
obtain the visa.
An alternative solution could consist of the possibility to submit the documents and to collect
one’s visa on the same day. The effective operation of such a system might necessitate further
improvements of the Schengen Information System and of other data collection systems, so as
to enable the immediate verification and comparison of data.
The constant rotation of the consular staff is intended to discourage the formation of bad
habits that could lead to a relaxed vigilance. Bad habits also include however excessive
restrictions, discrimination and the violation of human dignity of the persons who are at times
asked questions touching upon strictly private matters.
The proposed solutions suggested here are intended to reduce to a minimum the
inconveniences experienced by citizens of the countries neighbouring the EU applicant
countries in their travel to and from those countries, once the requirements of the Schengen
Treaty enter into force.
b) Types of visas that could facilitate the movement of persons
•  National visas
Before lifting border controls between old and new members:
National visas issued by candidate countries before accession may be less rigorous, as they do
not expose the EU members to any risk.
Once the candidate countries become members, border controls will be maintained on the
existing internal borders (e.g. Polish-German, Hungarian-Austrian) for some time. The
applicant countries will continue to be able to issue national visas on hitherto existing
principles, since the citizens of the states of Eastern Europe possessing such visas will not be
able to cross the border of the country that issued the visa.
The applicant states will naturally aim to making this period as short as possible, as the
continued control on the internal border will be unfavourably perceived psychologically, as a
symbol of incomplete or second-rate membership. The European Union should also strive to
shorten this period, not only in order to avoid giving rise to bad feelings, but also to mobilise
the border services of the states protecting the future external borders to promptly implement
the transformation required to reach the appropriate standards.FRIENDLY SCHENGEN BORDERLAND POLICY
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After lifting border controls between old and new members:
The national visa will then change its function. In accordance with the Schengen acquis, it
will only be issued for long-term residence, i.e. for stays of more than three months. It will
only entitle the holder to reside in the area of the country that issues such a visa. Staying in
other Schengen states can only be justified by transit through such states, during a maximum
of five days, which is not taken into account in the case of Eastern and South-East European
citizens.
It is technically feasible for third-country citizens holding long-term national visas to cross the
internal border, but the risk of sanctions in the event that the authorities learn of the visit to
another member state (complete ban on all entry to the EU for several years) should serve as
adequate deterrence.
Issuing long-term national visas in large numbers may become one of the main mechanisms
to facilitate travel by Eastern and South-East Europe’s citizens to accession countries willing
to pursue such a liberal policy.
It would comply with the Schengen acquis. The implementation of such a policy, however,
would require political dialogue with the member countries in order to reassure them of the
good will of the new members of the Union.
The absence of precise regulations concerning national, and therefore long-term, visas
introduced by the Schengen  acquis, and the fact that such regulations were left to the
competence of national governments, can probably be attributed to the belief by the
signatories of the respective convention treaties, that the national regulations concerning the
criteria for granting long-term national visas would not only be less lenient, but rather that
they would be more restrictive than the common regulations of the EU concerning visas
subject to the Schengen system. A liberal policy on the part of Poland and other new EU
member countries with this respect could therefore lead to unfavourable reactions on the part
of the EU. Liberal policies have to be well structured, as they must appear credible to old
members.
Likewise, the 15 EU countries should extend their thinking in terms of the categories of
Schengen and perceive in this solution the possibility to fashion an instrument for the foreign
policy of the Union that does not isolate its eastern neighbours.
•  The Schengen visa (allowing the holder to stay in all member states)
The key purpose of the visa procedure is to eliminate the risk of illegal immigration. In
principle, however, The verification procedures contained in the  acquis, however, are
intended to evaluate the risk of immigration in accordance with local conditions. In the case
of travel, when its main destination as declared by the citizen concerned is the neighbouring
country, and when there are no substantial grounds to doubt this, the formalities should be
simplified. The monitoring of the situation (e.g. a major increase in detentions of holders of
visas issued by the new member states, for illegal extension of their visit or other offences on
the territory of the 15 EU states) might provide the grounds for more stringent verification.
Similarly as in the case of national visas, political considerations require that travel is not
hindered by excessive formalities.
One example of a practical solution would be to eliminate the interview process (they are not
obligatory according to the acquis) or to perform an interview only for first-time visa
applicants. Practical facilitation could also be provided by the granting of multiple-entry visas
valid for one year, which the Schengen acquis allows for. Given the possibility of issuing aAPAP, B ORATYNSKI, EMERSON , GROMADZKI, VAHL & WHYTE
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long-term national visa, a visa valid for a period longer than one year, which is permitted by
the Schengen Treaty in certain cases, does not appear to be all that important.
The persons who should be regarded as the first in line to be entitled to access to these two
categories of visas, i.e. the long-term national visa and the multiple-entry Schengen visa valid
for one year (allowing a stay of a 6-month duration) may be divided into the following
categories:
a) persons involved in business activities;
b) persons active in culture, science, scholarship holders, students, sports;
c) persons visiting their families;
d) inhabitants of border regions (it could become a substitute for a simplified non-visa cross-
border movement in borderland areas which will not be compatible with Schengen); and
e) representatives of local government authorities, activists of non-government organisations
(NGO).
Should it prove impossible to introduce small-scale non-visa movement, the issuance of long-
term visas is a good alternative for the purpose of maintaining intensive cross-border contacts.
c) Inexpensive visas
Ideally, single-visit visas should be free of charge, with the cost covered by the EU. This
would send a strong political signal at a modest price. As a second-best solution, the price of
single-visit visas should not exceed 5-10 euro, and of multiple-entry Schengen visas and long-
term national visas allowing visits for defined periods of time ￿ 10-20 euro. The low price is
like a declaration of intent: We do not wish to establish barriers or additional obstacles. A
simultaneous reduction of prices to the same level by all of the member states could be a
valuable and well received gesture to accompany the enlargement.
d) Development and upgrading of border crossings
The EU should invest in the technical infrastructure at border crossings, which should ensure
the efficient and speedy crossing of the border. It should also contribute more to the
establishment of new border crossings on an external frontier where needed. A properly
developed infrastructure of border crossings and their adequate capacity to efficiently manage
the movement of people across the external border will be an important political message.
e) Attitude of border guards on the external frontier
An inclusive and open approach is not credible if the border guards – the first EU officials
that a foreigner meets upon entering EU territory – treat non-EU citizens like an inferior
species that is by definition suspect. The regulations concerning the organisation of the work
of consular services (common consular instructions) ought to be changed, as they bear the
imprint of this attitude.
Developing specific training activities and introducing appropriate organisational and
incentive mechanisms addressed to border guard and customs officers will help to limit
corruption and to significantly improve the approach to foreigners. Unfortunately, the
discrimination of foreigners and the violation of their dignity are daily occurrences at these
border crossings. This is a problem that characterises to some extent all of the external
borders of the European Union.
f) EU responsibility for external bordersFRIENDLY SCHENGEN BORDERLAND POLICY
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A pro-active policy on European borders wisely combining element of control with
facilitation of cross-border movements has to become the responsibility of the EU as a whole,
and not just the countries along its external frontier.
Investment in the infrastructure of border crossings from the EU budget must be increased.
Some support must also be extended to the consular services of countries bearing the highest
burden of issuing visas and having intensive networks of consular offices in the territories of
EU neighbours. It could be the first step towards creating Euro-consulates, which could
optimise cost-effectiveness and facilitate access to Schengen visas.
The idea of European border guards seems to be a distant future and moving whole units of
Polish border guards to the Turkish-Greek border or Germans on the Hungarian-Ukrainian
border is not necessarily rational. However, the placement of individual officers from member
states in border guard units on external borders could be an effective instrument of fostering
the concept of European responsibility and promoting trust between member states.
g) Mutuality on the part of East European states
The quest for ways to alleviate the impact of the introduction of visas ought to be the subject
of political dialogue not only of a bilateral nature (by the new members with the individual
Eastern European non-candidate states), but also between the Union and the individual
countries of Eastern Europe. The dialogue should cover the following issues:
•  Co-ordination of mutual measures by each party in visa policy and a civilised manner
of the introduction of visas, i.e. by giving adequate advance notice, and by broadly
disseminating the respective information addressed to the people concerned.
•  The introduction of mechanisms aimed at reducing the fear of illegal immigration on
the part of the countries of the Union, i.e. by increasing the effectiveness of the readmission
agreements (with Ukraine) and also by signing such agreements with other countries.
•  The introduction of similar non-restrictive mechanisms with regard to citizens of the
EU countries travelling to Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately, in view of the mindset typically found among Eastern European political
elites, one has to anticipate that there would be a certain lack of commitment or enthusiasm in
engaging in a dialogue of that kind. The requirement to apply for a visa will be an
inconvenience above all for the ordinary citizen, rather than for politicians or big
businessmen. And even if there did exist good political will on the part of these same elites,
the inefficiency of the state administration may turn out to be a major hindrance to the
effectiveness of such dialogue. Nevertheless, support for such dialogue ought to be one of the
main components of the long-term foreign policy of the Union, and should not remain solely
within the competence of the ministries of internal affairs of the individual EU states.
The introduction of visas for the citizens of the newly admitted member countries of the
Union by the countries of Eastern Europe remains today a virtually unnoticed effect of the
introduction of the Schengen acquis. In the face of the above-mentioned inefficiency of the
administration prevailing there, it might very effectively discourage travels to the East, which
even under the present arrangements for visa-free movement are not very frequent.
Paradoxically, the decline of traffic in that direction may turn out to be far more painful in the
longer term. After all, such a situation would widen the distance between the neighbouring
nations and reinforce their ignorance of one another. In order to avoid a scenario of that kind,
the possibility of granting support for the development and modernisation of consular services
of the Eastern European countries with the assistance of aid programmes should be taken into
serious consideration. More importantly, the future East European neighbours of the EUAPAP, B ORATYNSKI, EMERSON , GROMADZKI, VAHL & WHYTE
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should be encouraged not to reciprocate in kind when the EU accession candidates introduce
visas for their citizens. Although such an asymmetry might be hard to accept politically, the
EU’s neighbours should recognise that the EU’s concerns are legitimate, and that it would be
counter-productive to make this issue into a contest of political will.
3.1 Long-term solutions
We are aware that the present mood in the European Union does not favour introducing
modifications to the Schengen Treaty, or any far-reaching changes in the visa policy with
respect to the Eastern European countries. We consider it to be our duty, however, to put
forward these ideas for public discussion, as we believe they will play a major role in any
debate on the forum of the European Union over the next decade.
a) Modification of the ‘black list’
Citizens of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia must produce a visa upon entering the
EU. The possibility of removing the Eastern European countries from the black list in the
future should be considered. Their presence on the list is largely caused by the fear of
intensive immigration. Such fears were expressed in advance of previous EU enlargements,
but with hindsight were found to be unfounded. The same fear was evident at the beginning of
the 1990s, when the matter of removal of visas for Central European citizens was discussed in
the EU. The experience of the past decade has demonstrated, however, that the fear of a flood
of immigration from countries such as Poland or Hungary was completely unjustified.
•  Ukraine
The removal of Ukraine from the black list may seem today utterly utopian, when we
compare the living standards in Ukraine and in the EU countries. Also the sheer size of the
country, with a population of 50 million, may provide an argument against Ukraine. In the
perspective of a number of years, especially if a process of real reforms will start in Ukraine,
such a scenario should begin to be taken into account seriously. This would require the
establishment of an effective control system on the external border, so as to eliminate the
crossing of the border by persons recorded in the Schengen Information System. It would also
be important to put effective controls in place on the Russian-Ukrainian border. Controls on
the border, although not directly relevant to the issue of visas, would enhance the growth of
confidence in Ukraine and could serve as an additional instrument of stopping illegal
immigration from non-European countries.
•  Belarus
Belarus is a definitely smaller country than Ukraine, and hence it possesses a significantly
smaller migration potential. The emergence of substantial political changes, such as the fall of
the Lukashenka regime, could provide an excellent opportunity for the Union to eliminate
visas. It would also encourage further transformations and strengthen the pro-western
orientation, which at present is virtually absent.
•  Russia
Due to the size of the country, the scenario of removing visas appears to be the most remote,
but in the case of favourable changes in Russia, it could become a very important instrument
for strengthening the pro-western option. Just as in the case of the above-mentioned two
countries, Russia’s potential as a source of illegal immigration is far overstated. This is also
evidenced by up-to-date statistics concerning illegal visits and deportations.FRIENDLY SCHENGEN BORDERLAND POLICY
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Special regulations are required for Kaliningrad, which will become a Russian enclave within
the European Union. Kaliningrad should obviously be one of the priority targets of the
proposals of the first section of these recommendations, e.g. the procedure of granting long-
term national visas for citizens of that district should be simplified significantly. One should
also take into account the possibility of removing the visa requirement for the inhabitants of
that region – which would of course require an agreement between the EU and Russia, as well
as appropriate modifications of the black list. Obviously, high standards of verification of
persons crossing the SIS border should be observed. It would be worthwhile to extend the
solutions applied for Kaliningrad so as to cover the other Russian regions that will border the
enlarged EU.
Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries
Restoring visa-free travel to those citizens of ex-Yugoslav republics who do not currently
enjoy it, and extending this right also to Albania, should be one of the political priorities built
into the  EU's Stabilisation and Association Process ￿ conditioned of course on the
implementation of reforms, in much the same way as Bulgaria and Romania were obliged to
undertake. The problem of issuing travel documents for Kosovo residents who may have
difficulty in obtaining or using Yugoslav passports is, however, more directly the problem of
the international community.
b) The possibility to obtain a visa on the border
At present, visas are issued on the border only in exceptional cases. The future development
of the technical infrastructure of the SIS (introduction of easy-to-use magnetic readers,
popularisation of passports with a magnetic code) would allow for visas to be issued on the
border. That would require the application of readers able to immediately and automatically
print visa stickers. Such a possibility could apply to persons who have passed the procedure of
visa application before, and have a clear record in the SIS. The inspection of passport
documents with the use of a reader, and the comparison of data upon the person’s departure
from the EU area, would allow an immediate determination of whether the duration of the
visit had been exceeded.
This could in time lead to the abolishment of visas as such. According to this scenario, a visa
would only be issued at the initiative of a person travelling to the countries of the European
Union. Its purpose would be also to reduce the risk of refusal of entry and the related losses
due to the travel expenses incurred. A model of universal movement without visas (currently
allowing for visits of up to three months) would require advanced SIS technological solutions.
Similarly as in the above-mentioned scenario, the so-called traditional visa procedure could be
compulsory upon the first visit.
c) Multiple single-day entry visa
One way to simplify the entry by the citizens living close to the EU’s future border (e.g.
residents of the St. Petersburg area, Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and  Kaliningrad
District, Moldovans, Serbs and Hungarians in  Voivodina, etc.), and at the same time to
prevent them from staying illegally in other EU countries, is to provide them with a multiple
single-day entry visa (MDV). It would be a travel document valid only together with a
passport allowing a maximum of (for example) an 18-hour stay in one of these countries. If
the person exceeded the duration of stay allowed by the visa, the border guards would retain
the MDV and from that time forward, the person concerned could only enter the country on
the basis of a Schengen Visa.APAP, B ORATYNSKI, EMERSON , GROMADZKI, VAHL & WHYTE
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The MDV could work like a credit card, which would facilitate the handling and make the
clearance procedure quicker. Upon entry to Poland, it would be inserted in a reader machine.
If the allowed duration of stay had been exceeded, the machine would withhold the card upon
the return. It would limit the possibilities for the persons using a document of that type of
getting across to the territories of other EU countries, since a the journey from the area of
Eastern Europe to Germany, for example, and back within 18 hours is practically impossible.
At the same time, such a border clearance regime would enable the individual to maintain
small business trade, neighbourly and family contacts, as well as employment in the border
zone.
e) Active immigration policy
A long-term foreign policy on the part of the European Union should effectively limit the
pathological phenomena such as the smuggling of people by organised criminal groups,
without isolating the immediate neighbours of the Union at the same time. The demographic
situation (the dramatic ageing of society and the fall of the birth rate below the level of simple
reproduction of generations) both in the countries of Western and Central Europe, with the
resulting implications for the employment markets, pension systems and health care systems,
demonstrate clearly that Europe is in need of immigrants. For this reason, entry to the EU for
hundreds of seasonal workers should be legalised. The existing policy involves immense
hypocrisy. On the one hand, we pretend to abide by stringent and restrictive laws and on the
other, we tolerate the existence of extensive areas of the shadow economy based on immigrant
labour, which is undoubtedly beneficial .Both the immigration regulations and the insurance
and tax regulations need to be reconsidered, as they provide the soil in which the pathologies
grow. Although the immigration policy is above all a challenge to the countries of the 15 EU
countries, it increasingly also concerns the future member states, as shown by the experience
of recent years .
Undoubtedly, the scenarios presented here require huge investments in order for the visa-free
border control methods to be effective. The new members, on whom the core burden of
responsibility for protecting the external border will rest, will need to receive technical and
financial support from the Union. We should also bear in mind, however, that the outlay of
capital expenditures involved would be balanced by the decreasing costs of consular services,
which are very high at present.13
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